MEANING AND SEMANTICS
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
1.1
Introduction
Semantics
is a sub discipline of linguistics which focuses on the study of meaning.
Semantics tries to understand what meaning is as an element of language and how
it is constructed by language as well as interpreted, obscured and negotiated
by speakers and listeners of language.
Semantics
is closely linked with another sub discipline of linguistics, pragmatics, which
is also, broadly speaking, the study of meaning. However, unlike pragmatics,
semantics is a highly theoretical research perspective, and looks at meaning in
language in isolation, in the language itself, whereas pragmatics is a more
practical subject and is interested in meaning in language in use. Semantics is
the study of meaning. Meaning has been given different definitions in the past.
Meaning simply the set of associations that a word evokes, is the meaning of a
word defined by the images that its users connect. So 'winter' might mean
'snow', 'sledging' and 'mulled wine'. But what about someone living in the
amazon? Their 'winter' is still wet and hot, so its original meaning is lost.
Because the associations of a word don't always apply, it was decided that this
couldn't be the whole story.
Semantics
is interested in: first, how meaning works in language: The study of semantics
looks at how meaning works in language, and because of this it often uses
native speaker intuitions about the meaning of words and phrases to base
research on. We all understand semantics already on a subconscious level, it's
how we all understand each other when we speak. Second, how the way in which
words are put together creates meaning: one of the things that semantics looks
at, and is based on, is how the meaning of speech is not just derived from the
meanings of the individual words all put together, as you can see from the
example below. The Principle of Compositionality says that the meaning of
speech is the sum of the meanings of the individual words plus the way in which
they are arranged into a structure. The relationships between words: semantics
also looks at the ways in which the meanings of words can be related to each
other. Here are a few of the ways in which words can be semantically related.
1.2
Problem Statement
Based on
explanation above, the problem statement of this paper, are;
1. What is study of semantics?
2. What is study of meaning?
CHAPTER II
DISSCUSION
2.1
Study of Semantics
2.1.1
The Definition of Semantics
Semantics
is the study of meaning Lyons (1977). Semantics is the study of meaning in language
Hurford & Heasley 1983. Semantics is the part of linguistics that is
concerned with meaning Löbner (2002). Semantics is the study of meaning communicated
through language Saeed (1997). Lobner, Sebastian (2002). Understanding Semantics. Arnold: London:
Blackwell. Saeed, John I. (1997). Semantics. Oxford: Blackwell. [Two recent
introductions to semantics; they cover the main areas and our course will be
partially based on them]. Hurford James and Brendan Heasley (1983). Semantics: a coursebook. Cambridge, CUP. [a
sort of “do-it-yourself” textbook on semantics; lots of exercises]. Lyons, John (1977): Semantics 1
& 2. Cambridge, CUP. [One of the “Bibles” of semantics; it is old but
complete. Quite dense, use only for reference of specific points]. From
explanation above, it can be conclude that, Language uses a system of linguistic signs,
each of which is a combination of meaning and phonological and or orthographic
forms. Semantics is traditionally defined as the study of meaning in language.
In other word semantics is the branch of linguistics that deals with the study
of meaning, changes in meaning, and the principles that govern the relationship
between sentences or words and their meanings.
The linguistic approach studies the properties
of meaning in a systematic and objective way, with reference to as wide a range
of utterances and languages as possible (David Crystal, How Language Works.
Overlook, 2006). Based on the distinction between the meanings of words and the
meanings of sentences, we can recognize two main divisions in the study of
semantics: lexical semantics and phrasal semantics. Lexical semantics is the
study of word meaning, whereas phrasal semantics is the study of the principles
which govern the construction of the meaning of phrases and of sentence meaning
out of compositional combinations of individual lexemes. The job of semantics
is to study the basic, literal meanings of words as considered principally as
parts of a language system, whereas pragmatics concentrates on the ways in
which these basic meanings are used in practice, including such topics as the
ways in which different expressions are assigned referents in different
contexts, and the differing (ironic, metaphorical, etc.) uses to which language
is put (Nick Riemer, Introducing Semantics. Cambridge University Press, 2010).
2.1.2
Semantics Subject
Semantics
is the study of the relationships between signs and symbols and what they
represent. Some important areas of semantic theory or related subjects include
these: symbol and referent, conceptions of meaning, words and lexemes,
denotation, connotation, implication, pragmatics, ambiguity, metaphor, simile
and symbol, semantic fields, synonym, antonym and hyponym, collocation, fixed
expression and idiom, semantic change and etymology, polysemy, homonymy,
homophones and homographs, lexicology and lexicography, thesauruses, libraries
and web portals, epistemology, and color.
2.2
Study of Meaning
2.2.1
The Theories of Meaning
2.2.1.1
Definition of Meaning
Meaning is ‘Aboutness’ of natural language – A noise
that I make when I speak or a scribble that I produce when I write words in
English or a sign-language gesture I make are physical objects that convey
meanings, they are about something – We use language to communicate, to talk about
things in the world, people and their properties, relations between people,
events, in short about the way the world is, should be, could have been. The
property of ‘aboutness’ of linguistic signs (or symbols) is one of the defining
properties of natural languages, it is what a semantic theory of natural
languages tries to capture.
Where is meaning, can we define meanings in terms of
their physical properties? The answer is ‘no’, there are 3 main arguments for
this answer: First, generally, there are no physical features that all
meaningful noises or sets of marks have in common which serve to differentiate
them from other signals or noises. Usually there is no resemblance between a
name and the thing it is the name of.
Linguistic forms usually lack any physical resemblance with the entities
that they stand for. Not only do languages vary in their vocabularies, but also
within one language the relation between the words and what they stand for may
change (ex. gay).
In sum, the connection between a word and what it
stands for is arbitrary. “The arbitrariness of the linguistic sign” (Ferdinand
de Saussure, 1916, Cours de linguistique générale) is one of the defining
properties of human language. The meaning of words cannot be derived from their
physical properties, it cannot be reduced to the real-world objects or their
perception, and it cannot be reduced to the particular image in my or your
mind. The meaning of words is to be derived from the relations between words,
concepts and things in the real world.
Four theories to
the meaning of words:
A. Dictionary Meanings
a.
Dictionary Meaning
·
Demand (N)
The need or
desire that people have for particular goods or services.
·
Desire (N)
S strong hope or
wish.
·
Wish (N)
The act of
wishing for something.
·
Wish (V)
To hope that
something will happen.
b.
The Problem with
Dictionary Meaning
Understanding meaning of word involves understanding
all the words in definition.
For example,
word Circularity;
·
Pride : the quality or state of being proud
·
Proud : feeling or showing pride
They are not theoretical claims about the nature of
meaning, but a practical aid to people who already speak a language. They are
usually paraphrases. They may be a way of learning the meaning of some words,
but there is much more to word meaning than the dictionary definition.
B. Mental Image
Is
a graphic representation in one’s mind of a referent (when I say table, you
"draw" a table in your mind). There is much more to meaning than a
simple mental image. People may have very different mental images for same word
(lecture – from perspective of student vs. teacher). Some words, even though
having meaning, have no real definite image (honesty, or the). Mental images
are usually a prototype or standard of the referent (bird: what bird? image may
exclude atypical examples). Is a graphic representation in one’s mind of a
referent (when I say table, you "draw" a table in your mind). There
is much more to meaning than a simple mental image. People may have very
different mental images for same word (lecture – from perspective of student
vs. teacher). Some words, even though having meaning, have no real definite
image (honesty, or the). Mental images are usually a prototype or standard of
the referent (bird: what bird? image may exclude atypical examples).
C. Referents
Have
to do with the fact that words usually stand for (refer to) actual objects or
relations in the world. Example: “Dubya”, “Florida”, “Disney World.” There is
much more to meaning than a referent. It would exclude from language fantasies,
speculations, and fiction. (Santa Claus refers to what?). The fact that two
words (or expressions) refer to the same thing does not indicate that they mean
the same thing. (Queen Elizabeth = Queen of England in 2005). What referents do
these words have: forget, the, some…?
D. Componential
The meaning of a word is specified by smaller
semantic components. Semantic components are primitive elements of meaning
expressed as binary features (+ or -).
a.
Semantic Decomposition
Ø Woman:
·
[+ human]
·
[+ female]
·
[+ adult]
Ø Man:
·
[+ human]
·
[- female]
·
[+ adult]
Ø Girl:
·
[+ human]
·
[+ female]
·
[- adult]
Ø Boy:
·
[+ human]
·
[- female]
·
[- adult]
b.
Advantages of
Componential Theory
c.
Disadvantages of Componential Theory
1)
Difficult to
analyze abstract concepts.
Ø What are the semantic components of blue?
Ø [+ color]? [+
blueness]?
2)
Meaning of
semantic components is sometimes no more explanatory than the words they are
specifying.
3)
Analysis in
terms of lexical relations- explain the meaning in terms of the relationship
with other words.
Ø Synonymy.
Ø Antonymy.
Ø Hyponymy.
Ø Prototype.
Ø Homophones and Homonyms.
Ø Polysemy.
2.3
Study of Ostensive and Naming
2.3.1
The Theories of Ostensive
An ostensive definition conveys the meaning of a
term by pointing out examples. This type of definition is often used where the
term is difficult to define verbally, either because the words will not be
understood (as with children and new speakers of a language) or because of the
nature of the term (such as colors or sensations). It is usually accompanied
with a gesture pointing out the object serving as an example, and for this
reason is also often referred to as "definition by pointing".
Ostensive definitions rely on an analogical or case-based reasoning by the
subject they are intended to (citation needed).
For example, defining "red" by pointing out
red objects apples, stop signs, roses is giving ostensive definition, as is
naming. Ostensive definition assumes the questioner has sufficient
understanding to recognize the type of information being given. Ludwig
Wittgenstein writes: So one might say: the ostensive definition explains the
use the meaning of the word when the overall role of the word in language is
clear. Thus if I know that someone means to explain a colour word to me the
ostensive definition "That is called 'sepia' " will help me to understand
the word. One has already to know (or be able to do) something in order to be
capable of asking a thing's name.
The limitations of ostensive definition are
exploited in a famous argument from the Philosophical Investigations (which
deal primarily with the philosophy of language), the private language argument,
in which Wittgenstein asks if it is possible to have a private language that no
one else can understand.
2.3.2
The Theories of Naming
The naming theory,
proposed by Plato, ancient Greek scholar.
The linguistic forms /
symbols or the words used in a language are simply labels of the objects they
stand for therefore, words are just names or labels for things. This theory is
imperfect, obviously. It is only applicable to physical objects, but not to abstract
notions such as dragon, think, hard, joy and slowly.
The conceptualist view,
held by some ancient philosophers and linguists with Ogden and Richards as its
representatives. Words are referent to things through mediation of concepts of
the mind. That is, there is no direct link between a linguistic form and what
is refers to; rather, in the interpretation of meaning they linked through the
mediation of the concepts in the mind. The semantic triangle or triangle of
significance. This theory avoids many of the problems the naming theory has
encountered, but it also raises a completely new problem of its own. What is
precisely the link between the symbol and the concept remains un-clarified.
People do not actually try to see the image of something in their mind’s eye
every time they come across a linguistic symbol.
2.4
The Study of Arbitrary and Convention
2.4.1
The Theories of Arbitrary
I can make the same statements using the English
sentence. This is an apple and the Russian sentence Eto jábloko with the same
meaning. Whatever relation the English word apple has to the particular piece
of fruit, words for the apple in other languages can have as well. In addition,
within one language the relation between the words and what they stand for
changes (ex. gay).
One of the defining properties of human language is
“the arbritraryness of the linguistic sign” (Ferdinand de Saussure, 1916, Cours
de linguistique generale): the connection between a word and what it stands for
is arbitrary There is no resemblance between sound and meaning, the relationship
is said to be arbitrary.
The relation between a word and the thing that it
names is not a resemblance relation, it must be something entirely
different. It cannot be located in the
objects that we talk about. A given word like apple as we use it refers not
just to the particular apples that you have seen or that are around us when we
use it, but to all apples, whether or not you know of their existence. You may
have learned the word by being shown some sample, but you will not understand
it if you think it is just the name of those samples. You and I, who have
encountered different examples of apples, use the word apple with the same
meaning. The word apple as you use it has something else behind it--a concept,
idea, thought or sense--which somehow reaches out to all the apples in the
universe.
Indirect relation between the world and the world,
for example; word refer to a concept, idea, thought refer to thing in the world
apple.
This indirect relation between the word and the
world raises new problems: It looks as though we have just complicated the
problem. In trying to explain the
relation between the word apple and the thing apple by interposing between them
the idea or concept of ‘apple’, we have just created further need to explain
the relations between the word and the idea, and between the idea and the
stuff.
2.4.2
The Theories of Convention
Meaning
is more than a matter of intentions of individual’s speakers, it is also a
matter of convention that is accepted, acknowledged, or otherwise believed by
the language users. What a linguistic sign represents (is about, means) is
determined by some publicly accepted convention.
Convention
is apart from language, other facts that in some sense are facts by human
agreement (e.g., facts about money, governments, property, marriage,
universities) can be motivated in essentially the same way: What stands to the
sound [CHAIR] as its meaning is what stands to a piece of paper as its function
as a dollar bill. Constitutive rule for institutional facts: X stands for Y
(status function) in context C, and it does so by some public convention. This
piece of paper stands for a one-dollar bill. The person who kills another (X
term), under certain circumstances (C term), and is found guilty of so doing is
assigned the status of ‘convicted murderer’ (Y term, and hence an
institutational fact).
According
to Searle (1995, The Construction of Social Reality), language plays a crucial
role in the construction of such social facts, facts that have an objective
existence only because we believe them to exist.
Look
at meaning from this perspective: Meaning is conventional. Conventions give the
expressions in the language we use the meanings they have. More specifically,
one might say that regularities in the use of expressions in a community
determine their meanings. At least, this roughly Lewisian picture is what I
presuppose in this post, ignoring the possibility that there might be different
languages the community uses and also ignoring many other annoying details.
From
this perspective, one might wonder what the conventionalist determination
thesis is. Above, I stated it as follows: The conventional use of expressions
in a community determines the meanings of the expressions. For this post, I
want to consider the question what these meanings are which are determined.
There is some pressure to answer this question since the semantics/pragmatics
debate gave us many notions. In other words, the question is this:
(Q)
If it is true that the conventional use of expressions in a community
determines meanings M(e) of expressions e, of which kind is M?
Some candidates
for M are:
1.
A compositional
literal word meaning scheme (minimally conceived, not a propositional meaning
but rather something "with slots in it which have to be filled", e.g.
for "it rains" something like "That it rains at time ___ in
location ___").
2.
What is said
(minimally conceived, something like a minimal proposition or what we could
call a "compositional literal word meaning", e.g. for "it
rains" that there is a time t and a location l so that it rains at t in
l).
3.
What is said
(pragmatically conceived, something enriched by mandatory and optional
pragmatic processes, e.g. for "it rains" that it rains here now).
4.
Conventionally
established Ersatz-meanings (Say, there is regularity to use and understand
"to take for granite" as meaning the same as "to take for
granted", the “take for granted”-meaning is then the conventionally
established Ersatz-meaning for “to take for granite”).
5.
Averaged Gricean
speaker meanings.
6.
Averaged Gricean
hearer meanings.
It
seems to me that all these options have some plausibility. Moreover, can we
really rule out that conventional use just determines one of these options?
Couldn't it be that conventional use also determines more pragmatic kinds of
meanings even while we are mostly interested in whether the conventional use
ultimately determines the really interesting basic meanings in a theory about
language and linguistic communication?
Let
us focus on the expressions "I take it for granted that I have a
hand" and "I take it for granite that I have a hand". Since
"I take it for granite that" is among the "common errors"
of English users, there is a sizeable share of uses of that expression which are
meant (and often understood) in the same way as "I take it for granted
that". Given a rich enough use of the constituents of these expressions,
it also seems that the constituents have a meaning. But then, it seems not
totally farfetched to assume that the expressions have all the meanings listed
above. That is, up to some transformations and parameterizations, we can
systematically construct the meanings using data about the conventional use as
input.
A
conventionalist might not even be inclined to protest. Nor people in the
semantics or pragmatics debate. I think the interesting questions become partly
empirical: Which meanings do we humans actually possess in such situations? How
do we acquire them? Which meanings play actually a role in (linguistic) communication
and understanding?
Another
share of interesting questions is possibly more philosophical or technical:
Which meanings must we postulate if the expression users are such-and-such and
want to do with the expressions this-and-that? (Let us call such meanings as
being "essential".) How should an ideal learner learn expressions? -
Also, this share of questions might be worthwhile to consider for
conventionalists and people in the semantics/pragmatics debate. But I think
this second group of questions should be a central concern for
conventionalists. Let me explain why.
If
a conventionalist couldn't make a case that she can explain how essential
meanings are determined, then her position would have a serious defect. If she
can explain more, then it shall be for the better. But explaining the
determination of essential meanings is a strict demand for providing an
adequate conventionalist account. Since she takes conventional use as the main
determinant, she is committed to the following thesis:
(C)
The conventional use of expressions in a community determines the essential
meanings of the expressions.
The
merits of stating the conventionalist's determination thesis (or theses if
there is more than one kind of essential meaning) in this way (C) are not clear,
however. The reason is that we seem to lack agreement what the essential
meanings are. Without such an agreement, accounts cannot be evaluated in an
interesting way. If one account has to provide A to be adequate and another B,
then both accounts might be adequate on their counts. Yet, the accounts might
be incompatible and at least one of them false. But on which grounds shall we
reject one of them? General theory evaluation criteria are much too loose to be
decisive. Empirically, it also seems to be hopeless when it is about the
meta-semantic project of providing a theory which explains how meaning is
determined. For there is no agreed-on data to test the theories and the
so-called “theories” are often too loose to yield empirically testable hypotheses.
Moreover,
the obvious candidates for essential meanings are all contested. I take the
obvious candidates to be the 1, 2, and 3. To provide some examples:
·
Récanati rejects
1 and 2.
·
Borg rejects 3.
·
Millikan and
Davis reject 5 and 6.
·
(And 4 does not
seem to be a candidate for an essential meaning since in many cases, there is
no such meaning.)
This
suggests that there is no agreement what the essential meanings are. Now one
might argue like this: But without such an agreement, there can’t be an
interesting evaluation of conventional accounts. And without being able to
evaluate in an interesting way, there is no scientific project in the first
place. So, (to say it in the words of a famous TV series character,) I cannot
help but wonder whether there is a scientific conventionalist project at all.
But
maybe there is. The following strategies seem to me possible (and I believe
some of them are actually endorsed by some conventionalists):
Ignorant:
Forget about the semantics/pragmatics debate, and do as if there were only
speaker meaning and word meaning. Then, the essential meaning is word meaning.
Speculator:
Think a little bit about the semantics/pragmatics debate. Bet on a position and
declare that the essential meaning notions are the ones of that position.
Fighter:
Don't bet, argue! Argue for the right position and conclude what the essential
meanings are.
Hard
worker: Compile a list of candidates for essential meanings by taking every
theory into account there is. Then show for each candidate that you can explain
how it is determined by conventional use.
Considerate
worker: Compile a list of candidates for essential meanings and show for some
of them that you can explain how they are determined by conventional use.
It
seems to me that that the first two strategies do not meet the standards of the
current debate. So, even if their results are interesting, they are out. The
third and fourth strategy is appealing but not the kind of work for a
one-man-show. The amount of work they seem to require seems to be out of scope.
This seems to leave only the “considerate worker”-strategy. And the strategy
has some appeal.
If
one can make the case (and I think that the case can be made) that for some
major positions in the semantics or pragmatics debate, the conventionalist can
defend a suitable conventionalist determination thesis, then I think that the
considerate conventionalist has provided what one should demand from her.
(Clearly, a conventionalist account has to satisfy other adequacy conditions
like providing a suitable notion of a convention but this is another story.)
So,
given a list of the major candidates of essential meanings, the thesis (C)
becomes a scheme of theses instances. Instances are generated by replacing the
placeholder “essential meanings” by a major candidate. And each instance has to
be established. Establishing the instances seems to me to be among the main
concerns for a conventionalist.
In
sum, linguistic signs have a representational or symbolic function that relies
in a crucial way on the intentions of language users to use them to communicate
a certain meaning. Meaning is more than a matter of intentions on the part of
individual language users, it is also a matter of convention, which is related
to the fact that the connection between a linguistic sign and what it stands
for is arbitrary. The property of aboutness (representational or symbolic
function) of linguistic signs (= symbols) is truly unique to linguistic signs
that is missing from other signs.
CHAPTER III
CONCLUSION
3.1
Conclusion
Semantic
is the study of meaning. It focuses on the relation between signifiers, like
words, phrases, signs, and symbols, and what they stand for, their denotation. Linguistic
semantics is the study of meaning that is used for understanding human expression
through language. Other forms of semantics include the semantics of programming
languages, formal logics, and semiotics.
The
word semantics itself denotes a range of ideas - from the popular to the highly
technical. It is often used in ordinary language for denoting a problem of
understanding that comes down to word selection or connotation. This problem of
understanding has been the subject of many formal enquiries, over a long period
of time, most notably in the field of formal semantics. In linguistics, it is
the study of interpretation of signs or symbols used in agents or communities
within particular circumstances and contexts. Within this view, sounds, facial
expressions, body language, and proxemics have semantic (meaningful) content,
and each comprises several branches of study. In written language, things like
paragraph structure and punctuation bear semantic content; other forms of
language bear other semantic content.
The
formal study of semantics intersects with many other fields of inquiry,
including lexicology, syntax, pragmatics, etymology and others, although
semantics is a well-defined field in its own right, often with synthetic
properties. In philosophy of language, semantics and reference are closely
connected. Further related fields include philology, communication, and
semiotics. The formal study of semantics is therefore complex.
Semantics
contrasts with syntax, the study of the combinatorics of units of a language
(without reference to their meaning), and pragmatics, the study of the
relationships between the symbols of a language, their meaning, and the users
of the language.
The
meaning of a complex expression is determined by its structure and the meanings
of its constituents once we fix what the parts mean and how they are put
together we have no more leeway regarding the meaning of the whole. This is the
principle of compositionality (Frege’s Principle), a fundamental presupposition
of most contemporary work in semantics.
REFFERENCES
Kreidler, Charles. W,
1998, Introducing English Semantics,
New York: Routledge.
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